Speaker: Allen W. Wood

Time: 9:00-11:00 am, April 8, 2023, GMT+8

Venue: Zoom Meeting (register through http://lxi.me/r5fvb)

Abstract:

Kant’s views about freedom of the will have often been understood entirely on the basis of his reflections about the metaphysical problem of transcendental freedom. This is a mistake, because Kant regards that problem as insoluble; Kant argues that transcendental freedom is logically consistent with natural causality but has no positive account of how both could subsist together. Practical freedom, the human capacity to make choices according to reason, is something Kant thinks we can prove on practical grounds; we can investigate practical freedom empirically when human beings exhibit it in their actions and when they do not. Practical freedom does presuppose transcendental freedom, but as a matter of theoretical metaphysics, we can neither form a theoretical concept of transcendental freedom nor gain any insight into how it might be possible. We can neither prove we have transcendental freedom nor prove that we do not have it. We misunderstand Kant’s views about freedom if we mix his empirical account of practical freedom with speculations about transcendental freedom.

Source: Department of Philosophy